On Abel's Concept of Doubt and Pessimism by Jouini, Elyès & Napp, Clotilde
On Abel’s Concept of Doubt and Pessimism
Elye`s Jouini, Clotilde Napp
To cite this version:
Elye`s Jouini, Clotilde Napp. On Abel’s Concept of Doubt and Pessimism. Journal of Economic
Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, 2008, 32, pp.3682-3694. <halshs-00176611v2>
HAL Id: halshs-00176611
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00176611v2
Submitted on 2 Jun 2010
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=915380
On Abels concept of doubt and pessimism
E. Jouini
CEREMADE Université Paris 9-Dauphine
Fellow of the Institut universitaire de France
C. Napp
CEREMADE Université Paris 9-Dauphine and CREST
September 27, 2006
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=915380
Abstract
In this paper, we characterize subjective probability beliefs leading to a higher
equilibrium market price of risk. We establish that Abels result on the impact of
doubt on the risk premium is not correct (see Abel, A., 2002. An exploration of the
e¤ects of pessimism and doubt on asset returns. Journal of Economic Dynamics
and Control, 26, 1075-1092). We introduce, on the set of subjective probability
beliefs, market-price-of-risk dominance concepts and we relate them to well known
dominance concepts used for comparative statics in portfolio choice analysis. In
particular, the necessary rst order conditions on subjective probability beliefs in
order to increase the market price of risk for all nondecreasing utility functions
appear as equivalent to the monotone likelihood ratio property.
Keywords : pessimism, optimism, doubt, stochastic dominance, risk premium,
market price of risk, riskiness, portfolio dominance, monotone likelihood ratio.
JEL numbers : D81, G11
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1. Introduction
We start from an equilibriummodel in which the (representative) agent is endowed
with a subjective probability Q di¤erent from the initial probability P: We want
to measure the impact of this subjective probability on the equilibrium market
price of risk. In particular, in relation with the Equity premium puzzle1, we are
interested in the characterization of the set of subjective probabilities leading to
an increase of the market price of risk for all utility functions in a given class.
Starting from the empirical ndings2 of Cecchetti et al. (2000), Abel (2002) has
considered a closely related problem. He denes pessimism (resp.doubt) as a First
Stochastic Dominance shift (resp. mean preserving spread) of the representative
agents subjective distribution of aggregate consumption. In order to analyze the
impact of pessimism on the equilibrium risk premium, Abel (2002) introduces
the stronger notion of uniform pessimism3 and proves, for a representative agent
endowed with a power utility function, that uniform pessimism is a su¢ cient
condition for an increase of the equilibrium risk premium. He also proves for
power utility functions and using Taylor series expansions that doubt increases
the equilibrium risk premium. However this result is wrong as shown on a simple
couterexample provided in Section 4.
Our aim is to characterize subjective beliefs leading to a higher equilibrium
market price of risk for large classes of utility functions. More precisely, according
to which class of utility functions we consider, we dene the market-price-of-risk
dominance of the rst-order (for all nondecreasing utility functions) and of the
second-order (for all nondecreasing and concave utility functions).
In fact, changes in beliefs (probabilities) can be interpreted in terms of changes
in risk (random variables) explored among others by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970
a. and b.), Meyer and Ormiston (1983), Landsberger and Meilijson (1990, 1993),
Hadar and Seo (1990), Ormiston and Schlee (1993), Gollier (1995), Gollier and
Schlesinger (2002).
We show that our rst-order (resp. second-order) market-price-of-risk domi-
nance is equivalent, when restated in terms of random variables, to the monotone
likelihood ratio dominance (resp. portfolio dominance) studied by Landsberger
1See Mehra and Prescott (1985) or Kocherlakota (1996) for a survey.
2The authors prove that a model in which consumers exhibit pessimistic beliefs can bet-
ter match sample moments of asset returns than can a rational expectations model. See also
the empirical study in Giordani and Söderlind (2003), where the authors provide evidence of
pessimism in investors forecasts.
3dened by Q (X  t) = P  X  et for some  > 0:
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and Meilijson (1990, 1993) and Gollier (1997).
We use these characterizations to provide examples of rst-order and second-
order market-price-of-risk dominance. In particular, we explore the case where
the total wealth is normally or log-normally distributed.
2. Market-price-of-risk dominance
Let (
;F ; P ) be a given probability space. We consider a standard 2 dates Lucas-
fruit tree economy, except that we allow the representative agent to have a sub-
jective belief/opinion. The representative agent solves a standard utility maxi-
mization problem. He has a current income at date t = 0; 1 denoted by (e0; e)
and a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function for consumption of the form
u0(c0) + E
Q [u(c)] ; where Q is a probability measure absolutely continuous with
respect to P which corresponds to the subjective belief of the agent: Throughout
the paper e is assumed to be nonnegative. If we denote by M the nonnega-
tive density of Q with respect to P , then the utility function can be rewritten
as u0(c0) + EP [Mu(c)] : We suppose that the economy is in equilibrium, i.e.
that there exists a nonnegative, nonzero and uniformly bounded price process4
q such that the optimal consumption plan for the representative agent (under
his budget constraint) coincides with the aggregate wealth of the economy, i.e.
e = argmaxEP [(c0 e0)+q(c e)]0

u0(c0) + E
P [Mu(c)]
	
. Such an equilibrium, when
it exists, can be characterized by the rst order necessary conditions for individ-
ual optimality. When the equilibrium is interior, these conditions are given by
Mu0(e) = u00(e0)q.
It is easy to obtain, as in the classical setting, the CCAPM formula. We
suppose the existence of a riskless asset with price process S0 such that S00 = 1 and
S01 =
 
1 + rf

for some risk free rate rf . We consider a risky asset with positive
price process S and associated rate of return between date 0 and 1 denoted by
R  S1
S0
  1. In such a context, since qS is a P martingale, we obtain
EP [R]  rf =  covP

q
EP [q]
; R

(2.1)
or equivalently
EP [R]  rf =  covP

Mu0 (e)
EP [Mu0 (e)]
; R

: (2.2)
4Prices are in terms of date-0 consumption units.
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The formula for the risk premium in the standard setting is given by
EP [R]  rf =  covP

u0 (e)
EP [u0 (e)]
; R

:
Note that the quantity covP
h
Mu0(e)
EP [Mu0(e)] ; R
i
that corresponds to the risk premium
in the subjective beliefs setting is not equal to  covQ
h
u0(e)
EQ[u0(e)] ; R
i
which would
correspond to the subjective risk premium EQ [R]   rf : Indeed, our aim is to
compare the risk premia from the econometrician point of view, i.e. under the
same objectiveprobability P . The risk premia we consider correspond then to
average realized risk premia and not to ex-ante subjectively expected ones.
In order to analyze the impact of the subjective belief on the value of the risk
premium, we must take into account the fact that the possible returns R obtained
in equilibrium are not the same in both settings. What exactly is to be compared ?
We consider an asset, whose terminal payo¤at date 1 is given by the aggregate
wealth e: Notice that such an asset exists by market completeness, but obviously
does not have the same price and return in both settings. However, the risk level
of such an asset5 is modied in the same proportions as the returns. We propose
to compare the market price of risk (i.e., the ratio between the risk premium and
the level of risk) in both settings, which leads us to compare  covP
h
u0(e)
EP [u0(e)] ; e
i
with  covP
h
Mu0(e)
EP [Mu0(e)] ; e
i
. Hence, the subjective belief setting leads to a higher
market price of risk if and only if
EQ [u0 (e) e]
EQ [u0 (e)]
 E
P [u0 (e) e]
EP [u0 (e)]
: (2.3)
We wish to characterize the set of such probabilities. Note that the probability
measures for which the market price of risk increases are those for which the
equilibrium relative price (of e) decreases and they are also those for which the
equilibrium risk premium in the sense of Abel (2002) increases.
Indeed, in the standard model, the equilibrium price pP (e) for e is given by
EP [qe] = EP [u0 (e) e] =u00(e0) and the price p
P (1) for a riskless asset whose payo¤
is always 1 is given by EP [q] = EP [u0 (e)] =u00(e0); hence the equilibrium relative
price rpP (e) is given by E
P [u0(e)e]
EP [u0(e)] ; which is then to be compared to the equilibrium
relative price in the subjective beliefs setting rpQ (e) = E
Q[u0(e)e]
EQ[u0(e)] : Besides, in Abel
5Measured either by the standard deviation or by a market (resp. consumption) beta.
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(2002), the risk premium is dened as the ratio between the expected return of
the considered asset and the riskfree return, i.e.
EP [R + 1]
1 + rf
=
EP
h
e
pP (e)
i
1 + rf
= EP [e]
1=
 
1 + rf

pP (e)
=
EP [e]
rpP (e)
;
so that the equilibrium risk premium in the subjective beliefs setting is higher
than in the standard setting if and only if (2:3).
We introduce the following denitions. We shall consider the sets U1 of all
continuous nondecreasing functions u on R+ such that lim supx!1 u0(x) <1 and
U2 of all continuous nondecreasing concave6 functions u on R+:
Denition 2.1. Let e be a nonnegative random variable on 
 and let F be the
sigma-algebra generated by e: Let Q1 and Q2 denote two probability measures on
(
; F ) such that EQi [e] <1, i = 1; 2. We say thatQ1 dominatesQ2 - with respect
to e - in the sense of the market price of risk of order i (Q1 <MPRi Q2) when for
all utility functions u in Ui, EQ1 [u0 (e) e]EQ2 [u0 (e)]  EQ2 [u0 (e) e]EQ1 [u0 (e)] :
Note that we do not refer anymore to an objective probability in this deni-
tion. However it su¢ ces to consider any probability measure P such that Q1 and
Q2 are absolutely continuous with respect to P to recover the interpretation of
EQ1 [u0(e)e]
EQ1 [u0(e)] (resp.
EQ2 [u0(e)e]
EQ2 [u0(e)] ) as the equilibrium relative price of e in a market where
the representative agent subjective belief is given by Q1 (resp. by Q2): Such a
probability P can be, for instance, any positive combination of Q1 and Q2:
Remark also that for u in Ui such that Qi(u0(e) 6= 0) 6= 0, i = 1; 2 we have
lim supx!1 u
0(x) <1 and since e is integrable, E
Qi [u0(e)e1ex]
EQi [u0(e)1ex]
is well dened for x
su¢ ciently large: Furthermore this quantity decreases when x goes to zero. Hence
EQi [u0(e)e]
EQi [u0(e)] is well dened at least as the limit of
EQi [u0(e)e1ex]
EQi [u0(e)1ex]
when x goes to zero.
Sections 3 and 4 are respectively devoted to rst-order and second-order market-
price-of-risk dominance.
3. First-order market-price-of-risk dominance
We rst show with a counter-example that Abels concept of pessimism dened
through First Stochastic Dominance is not su¢ cient to ensure MPR1 dominance.
6Note that all functions in U1 are almost everywhere di¤erentiable and all functions in U2
are almost everywhere twice di¤erentiable.
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We then prove the equivalence between MPR1 dominance and Monotone Like-
lihood Ratio dominance, introduced by Landsberger and Meilijson (1990) and
nally use this characterization to provide examples and interpret the MPR1 dom-
inance.
Abel (2002) uses the term pessimism to mean that the representative agents
subjective distribution of aggregate consumption is rst-order stochastically dom-
inated by the objective distribution. It has long been shown in the literature that
the standard stochastic orders are not su¢ cient in portfolio settings; in particular,
a rst stochastic dominance improvement of the returns of the risky asset needs
not generate a higher demand for it (see e.g. Fishburn and Porter, 1976 or Hadar
and Seo, 1990). As a consequence, it is intuititive that a FSD shift, as in Abel
(2002), should not necessarily reduce the equilibrium relative price of the risky
asset. We show it on the following simple example.
Suppose that e  U[1;3] and that the density of Q with respect to P is given
by f (e) where
f (x) =

x on [1; 2[
x  2 on [2; 3] :
It is easy to see on Figure 1 that P dominates Q in the sense of the rst
stochastic dominance. The probability measure Q is then pessimistic in the sense
of Abel (2002).
If the representative agent utility function is such that u0 (x) = 1x2 , we can
easily check that covPu(e; f(e)) > 0 where Pu has a density
u0(e)
EP [u0(e)] with respect
to P: Indeed, Pu does not charge ]2; 3] and f (e) increases with e under Pu: Now,
since

EQ[u0(e)e]
EQ[u0(e)]   E
P [u0(e)e]
EP [u0(e)]

= E
P [u0(e)]
EQ[u0(e)]cov
Pu(e; f(e)); this leads to a decrease of
the equilibrium risk premium.
As it can be seen in Figure 2., Q is pessimisticwith respect to P but opti-
misticwith respect to Pu (since it is almost surely increasing under Pu) and this
is the reason why we obtain a decrease of the equilibrium risk premium.
One could argue that this representative agents utility function is too specic
since it is not strictly increasing nor strictly concave and that Pu is not equivalent
to P . However, small perturbations of this function would lead to the same result.
Furthermore, we can check that we would obtain the same result for well chosen
power utility functions (e.g. u0(x) = x 6 ). Hence, even in the class of utility
functions studied in Abel (2002), the concept of pessimism introduced therein is
not su¢ cient to guarantee an increase of the equilibrium risk premium.
Notice that Abel (2002) does not claim that FSD is su¢ cient to ensure market-
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price-of-risk dominance for power utility functions. He does not discuss this point;
he introduces a stronger concept of pessimism, called uniform pessimism7, and
proves that this stronger notion is su¢ cient.
The next Proposition characterizes the rst-order market-price-of-risk domi-
nance. We recall the denition of the monotone likelihood ratio order, widely
used in the statistical literature and rst introduced in the context of portfolio
problems by Landsberger and Meilijson (1990)8. A distribution G is said to dom-
inate a distribution F in the sense of the MLR order (G <MLR F ) if there exist
numbers  1  x1  x2  1 and a nondecreasing function h : [x1; x2] ! [0;1]
such that G (C) = 0; 8C < x1; F (D) = 1; 8D > x2; and dG (x) = h (x) dF (x)
on [x1; x2] :
Proposition 3.1. Let Q1 and Q2 denote two probability measures on (
; F )
and let F1 (resp. F2) denote the distribution of e under Q1 (resp. Q2). Then
Q1 <MPR1 Q2 if and only if F2 <MLR F1.
Proof. 1. Let us assume that Q1 and Q2 are equivalent and that Q1 <MPR1 Q2:
We have then E
Q1 [u0(e)e]
EQ1 [u0(e)]  E
Q2 [u0(e)e]
EQ2 [u0(e)] for any u in U1. Since F is generated by e; dQ2dQ1
can be written in the form dQ2
dQ1
= h (e). Let us prove that the function h is non-
decreasing, or more precisely that the random variable ' dened on (R2;B (R2))
by ' (x1; x2) = h (x2)   h (x1) is Pe 
 Pe almost surely nonnegative on the open
half plane f(x1; x2) ; x1 < x2g .
Let us assume on the contrary that there exist two Borel real sets A1 and
A2 such that 9 A1 < A2, Pe(Ai) 6= 0; i = 1; 2 and ' is Pe 
 Pe almost surely
negative on A1 A2. We can choose A1 and A2 such that h (A1)  [a; a+ "] and
h (A2)  [b  "; b] for some a > b and 0 < " < a  b:
We have then Q2(e2A1)
Q1(e2A1) =
EQ1
h
dQ2
dQ1
1e2A1
i
Q1(e2A1) 2 [a; a+ "] and
Q2(e2A2)
Q1(e2A2) 2 [b  "; b] :
Let  > 0 be given and let  = Q1(A1)
Q1(A1)+Q1(A2)
: We have
a+ (1  ) (b  ")  Q2(A1)
Q1(A1)
+ (1  )Q2(A2)
Q1(A2)
  (a+ ") + (1  )b
7dened by Q (X  t) = P  X  et for some  > 0:
8More precisely, Landsberger and Meilijson (1990) showed that in the standard portfolio
problem a MLR shift in the distribution of returns of the risky asset leads to an increase in
demand for the risky asset for all agents with nonincreasing utilities.
9For two real subsets A1 and A2, A1 < A2 stands for 8(a1; a2) 2 A1 A2, a1 < a2.
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and for  2

Q1(A1)
Q1(A2)
"
a b ;
Q1(A1)
Q1(A2)
a b
"

; we obtain Q2(A1)
Q1(A1)
+ (1  )Q2(A2)
Q1(A2)
2 (b; a) : It
follows then that for such ; dQ2
dQ1
is higher (resp. lower) than Q2(A1)+Q2(A2)
Q1(A1)+Q1(A2)
on A1
(resp. A2).
Let  denote some real number in [supA1; inf A2] and let the utility function
u be dened by u0(x) = 1A1 + 1A2 : We have
EQ2 [eu0(e)]
EQ2 [u0(e)]
=
EQ2 [(e  ) 1A1 ] + EQ2 [(e  ) 1A2 ]
EQ2 [1A1 ] + E
Q2 [1A2 ]
+ 
=
EQ1
h
(e  ) dQ2
dQ1
1A1
i
+ EQ1
h
(e  ) dQ2
dQ1
1A2
i
EQ2 [1A1 ] + E
Q2 [1A2 ]
+ :
Now, since (e  )  0 and dQ2
dQ1
> Q2(A1)+Q2(A2)
Q1(A1)+Q1(A2)
on A1, we have (e  ) dQ2dQ1 
(e  ) Q2(A1)+Q2(A2)
Q1(A1)+Q1(A2)
onA1:Analogously we get that (e  ) dQ2dQ1 
Q2(A1)+Q2(A2)
Q1(A1)+Q1(A2)
(e  )
on A2 and one of these inequalities is strict. Hence
EQ2 [eu0(e)]
EQ2 [u0(e)]
<
Q2(A1) + Q2(A2)
Q1(A1) + Q1(A2)
EQ1 [(e  ) 1A1 ] + EQ1 [(e  ) 1A2 ]
EQ2 [1A1 ] + E
Q2 [1A2 ]
+ 
<
EQ1 [(e  ) 1A1 ] + EQ1 [(e  ) 1A2 ]
EQ1 [1A1 ] + E
Q1 [1A2 ]
+ 
<
EQ1 [eu0(e)]
EQ1 [u0(e)]
which contradicts the fact that Q1 <MPR1 Q2:
Conversely, E
Q2 [u0(e)e]
EQ2 [u0(e)] =
EQ1
h
dQ2
dQ1
u0(e)e
i
EQ1
h
dQ2
dQ1
u0(e)
i = EQu
h
dQ2
dQ1
e
i
EQ1 [u0(e)]
EQ1
h
dQ2
dQ1
u0(e)
i where Qu is dened
by a density with respect to Q1 equal (up to a constant) to u0(e): Since
dQ2
dQ1
is
nondecreasing in e, we have
EQu

dQ2
dQ1
e

 EQu

dQ2
dQ1

EQu [e]
hence
EQ2 [u0 (e) e]
EQ2 [u0 (e)]

EQu
h
dQ2
dQ1
i
EQu [e]EQ1 [u0 (e)]
EQ1
h
dQ2
dQ1
u0 (e)
i
 E
Q1 [u0 (e) e]
EQ1 [u0 (e)]
:
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2. Let us now consider the general case. We rst prove that if Q1 <MPR1 Q2;
subsets on which Q1 is zero correspond to values of e at the right-end of the real
line. Let (Ai)i=1;2 be disjoint real subsets such that
10 co(A1) \ co(A2) = ; and
such that Q1(e 2 A1) = 0. Let us dene u such that u0 = 1A1 + 1A2 with   0.
We have EQ2 [u0 (e) e]EQ1 [u0 (e)]  EQ2 [u0 (e)]EQ1 [eu0 (e)]  0 or equivalently

 
EQ2 [e1e2A1 ]Q1 [A2] Q2 [A1]EQ1 [e1e2A2 ]

+EQ2 [e1e2A2 ]Q1 [A2] Q2 [A2]EQ1 [e1e2A2 ] 0
for all   0: If we assume Qi(e 2 Aj) 6= 0 for i 6= j; we have E
Q2 [e1e2A1 ]
Q2[e2A1] 
EQ1 [e1e2A2 ]
Q1[e2A2] which leads to A2 < A1:
Let us now dene x1  inf fx : Q1(e > x) = 0g and let A  ( 1; x1   ") for
some " > 0 such that Q1(e 2 A) = 0: By construction, Q1(e 2 [x1   "; x1]) 6= 0.
If we assume Q2(e 2 A) 6= 0; we have [x1   "; x1] < A and this is impossible. We
have then Q2(e 2 A) = 0: Consequently, for all " > 0; Q2jfex1 "g is absolutely
continuous with respect to Q1jfex1 "g ; hence Q2jfe<x1g is absolutely continuous
with respect to Q1jfe<x1g.
Symmetrically, if we dene x02 = sup fx : Q2(e < x) = 0g ; we obtain that
Q1jfx02<eg is absolutely continuous with respect to Q2jfx02<eg :
If x02 > x1, we take x2 = x1 and h = 0 and we have  1  x2  x1  1,
Q2(e < x2) = 0; Q1(e > x1) = 0; Q2jfx2ex1g is absolutely continuous with
respect to Q1jfx2ex1g and
dQ2jfx2ex1g
dQ1jfx2ex1g
= h(e).
If x02  x1;we take x2 = x02 and Q2jfx2ex1g and Q1jfx2ex1g are equiva-
lent. The same argument as in 1. gives us then the existence of a nondecreasing
nonnegative function h such that
dQ2jfx2<e<x1g
dQ1jfx2<e<x1g
= h(e).
If Q1 (e = x1) = 0 (resp. 6= 0) and Q2 (e = x1) = 0 (resp. 6= 0) then the
previous reasoning can be extended to fx2 < e  x1g : If Q1 (e = x1) = 0 and
Q2 (e = x1) 6= 0 then it su¢ ces to take h (x1) = 1: Finally, it is easy to check
that we can not have Q1 (e = x1) 6= 0 and Q2 (e = x1) = 0: The point x2 is treated
analogously.
In order to establish the converse implication, it su¢ ces to prove, for A =
fx2  e  x1g ; thatEQ2 [u0 (e) e1A]EQ1 [u0 (e) 1A] EQ2 [u0 (e) 1A]EQ1 [eu0 (e) 1A] 
0 for all u in U1: Remark that this quantity is not modied if we replace Q1; Q2
and u0 (e) by Q1jfx2ex1g ; Q2jfx2ex1g and u0 (e) 1fx2ex1g: The result is then a
direct consequence of 1.
10If A is a given real subset, we denote by co(A) the convex hull of A:
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In fact, if we interpret our result in terms of portfolio dominance, we have
established that the MLR property is equivalent to the rst order conditions for
portfolio dominance for all agents with nondecreasing utility functions.
With the characterization obtained through Proposition 3.1, the MPR1 order
is now easily veriable. If e has a normal distribution N (1; 1) (resp. N (2; 2))
under Q1 (resp. under Q2) then Q1 <MPR1 Q2 if and only if 1 = 2 and 1  2:
The lognormal case works similarly11.
The comonotonicity condition between dQ2
dQ1
and e means that Q1 is more
pessimistic than Q2in the sense that it puts more weight when aggregate wealth
is low. An MPR1 shift in the subjective beliefs can then be interpreted as a
pessimistic shift. In particular, in the case of normal distributions, an MPR1
shift in the beliefs corresponds to a lower subjective expected value for e with no
modication of the risk level. This notion of pessimism is stronger than the one
introduced in Abel (2002) since it is immediate and well known that if F2 <MLR
F1, then F2 <FSD F1:
4. Second-order market-price-of-risk dominance
Abel (2002) denes doubt as a mean preserving spread of the distribution of
growth rates of aggregate consumption. As previously underlined, the com-
mon stochastic orders fail to rank demand in portfolio problems, hence it is
intuitive that second-order stochastic dominance should not characterize market-
price-of-risk dominance of the second-order. Abel (2002) proves, for power util-
ity functions, and using Taylor series expansions, that doubt reduces the aver-
age equity premium. In fact, this result is wrong12 as easily seen on the fol-
lowing simple couterexample. Let us consider13 
 = f0:9; 1; 1:1; 2; 25; 48g with
P = (0; 1
2
; 0; 0; 1
2
; 0) and Q = (1
4
; 0; 1
4
; 1
4
; 0; 1
4
): It is easy to see that Q is a mean
preserving spread of P: If we consider the utility function u(x) =   1
x
; we obtain
EP [u0(e)e]
EP [u0(e)] = 1; 04 and
EQ[u0(e)e]
EQ[u0(e)] = 1; 10 which means that the risk premium under
11As underlined by Landsberger and Meilijson (1990), this order holds for exponential type
families (exponential, geometric, Poisson, binomial with the same number of trials, Gamma with
the same shape parameter).
12Abels proof is based on second order Taylor expansions and provides an approximate es-
timation of the risk premia. Focusing on the two rst moments is more or less equivalent
to restricting ones attention to normal distributions for which all mean-preserving dominance
concept coincide with a variance ranking.
13The states of the world are indexed by the values taken by e:
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Q is lower than under P:
Our aim is to characterize second order market-price-of-risk dominance. With
the same notations as in the previous section14, let X1  F1 and X2  F2.
Then, second-order market-price-of-risk dominance, which is given by E
Q2 [u0(e)e]
EQ2 [u0(e)] 
EQ1 [u0(e)e]
EQ1 [u0(e)] for all nondecreasing and concave utility functions u is equivalent to
E [u0 (X2)X2]
E [u0 (X2)]
 E [u
0 (X1)X1]
E [u0 (X1)]
or equivalently
E [u0 (X1) (X1   )] = 0) E [u0 (X2) (X2   )]  0 8:
As shown by Gollier (1997, Condition (6)), this last condition characterizes Port-
folio Dominance, a concept introduced in the context of portfolio problems15 by
Landsberger and Meilijson (1993) and further studied by Gollier (1997).
Using Proposition 1 in Gollier (1997), we easily deduce that Q1 MPR2 Q2 if
and only if
8(x; y) 2 R2+  R2+;
P2
i=1 yiE
Q1 [e1exi ]P2
i=1 yiE
Q1 [1exi ]

P2
i=1 yiE
Q2 [e1exi ]P2
i=1 yiE
Q2 [1exi ]
:
Since this condition is not intuitive and is hard to check, we give in the following
some simple necessary or su¢ cient conditions for second-order market-price-of-risk
dominance, we relate it to the common rst and second stochastic dominances, we
interpret our dominance concept in terms of pessimism and doubt and illustrate
it by simple examples.
Notice rst that, as shown by Landsberger and Meilijson (1993), mean pre-
serving spreads are neither su¢ cient nor necessary for portfolio dominance, hence
Abels concept of doubt fails to rank market price of risk under subjective beliefs
in a general setting.
It is well known that FSD is neither su¢ cient nor necessary in order to ensure
portfolio dominance, and so it is for our concept. In particular, it is immediate
14We recall that Fi denotes the distribution of e under Qi; i = 1; 2:
15More precisely, we recall that in the standard portfolio problem, a shift in the distribution
of the risky asset is portfolio dominated if it reduces the demand for the risky asset for all
risk-averse agents, irrespective of the risk free rate. Landsberger and Meilijson (1993) restricted
their attention to mean-preserving changes in distribution.
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to see that if there exists  such that, for all x; EQ1 [e1ex]  EQ2 [e1ex] and
Q1 fe  xg  Q2 fe  xg ; then Q1 <MPR2 Q2: Figures 3 and 4 provide an
example in which the previous conditions are satised but not FSD. Moreover,
taking  = 1; these conditions correspond to FSD, i.e. Q1 puts more weight
on fe  xg than Q2; with the additional condition that on fe  xg, Q1 puts
more weight on the low values. This condition seems to be closely related to
the comonotonicity condition that characterizes the rst-order market-price-of-
risk dominance but it can be shown on simple examples that these two conditions
are not equivalent. Figure 5 provides such an example.
The next Proposition shows that all distributions, which are mean-preserving
MPR2 ordered are also variance ordered.
Proposition 4.1. Let Q1 and Q2 denote two probability measures on (
; F ). If
Q1 <MPR2 Q2, if EQi [e2] < 1, i = 1; 2 and if EQ1 [e] = EQ2 [e] then V arQ1 [e] 
V arQ2 [e]
Proof. Let us rst assume that e has a nite support and let e be such that
P fe  eg = 0: Taking u0(x) = ( e  x)1xe, we have
eEQ1 [e]  EQ1 [e2]
e  EQ1 [e] 
eEQ2 [e]  EQ2 [e2]
e  EQ2 [e] :
Since we assumed EQ1 [e] = EQ2 [e], we have EQ1 [e2]  EQ2 [e2] or equivalently
V arQ1 [e]  V arQ2 [e] : If e does not have a nite support, we still take u0(x) = (
e   x)1xe for some e. Since EQ1 [e21ee] (resp. EQ2 [e21ee] ) converges to
EQ1 [e2] (resp. EQ2 [e2]) when e goes to innity, we have for " > 0 given and for e
su¢ ciently large
EQi

ek
  ek 2"  EQi ek1ee  EQi ek ; k = 0; 1; 2; i = 1; 2
We have then
e
 
EQ1 [e]  1
e
"
  EQ1 [e2]
e   EQ1 [e]  1
e
"
  eEQ2 [e]   EQ2 [e2]  "
e
 
1  1
e2
"
  EQ2 [e]
which leads to
eEQ1

e  e
2
e

  "
 h
e  EQ1 [e]  "
e
i


eEQ1

e  e
2
e

+ "
 h
e  EQ1 [e] + "
e
i
:
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Dividing by e and taking the limit when e goes to innity and " goes to zero we
obtain EQ1 [e2]  EQ2 [e2] or equivalently V arQ1 [e]  V arQ2 [e] :
The next proposition provides conditions that ensure second-order market-
price-of-risk dominance. This result is somehow a converse of the result stated in
the previous proposition. Indeed, if the probability measures Q1 and Q2 satisfy
these conditions, then e has the same expectation under the two probabilities and
has a higher variance under Q1:
Proposition 4.2. If the density of e under Q2 is symmetric (with respect to
EQ2 [e]) and if the density of Q1 with respect to Q2 is a function of e; symmet-
ric with respect to EQ2 [e], nonincreasing before EQ2 [e] and nondecreasing after
EQ2 [e] then Q1 <MPR2 Q2:
Proof. Suppose that the density of Q1 with respect to Q2 can be written in the
form dQ1
dQ2
= f
 
e  EQ2 [e] where f is an even function, increasing on R+: We
have
EQ1 (eu0 (e))
EQ1 (u0 (e))
=
EQ2 [f () (u0 (m+ )  u0 (m  )) 10]
EQ2 [f () (u0 (m+ ) + u0 (m  )) 10] :
where m = EQ2 [e] and  = e m: We want to compare this quantity with
EQ2 (eu0 (e))
EQ2 (u0 (e))
=
EQ2 [ (u0 (m+ )  u0 (m  )) 10]
EQ2 [(u0 (m+ ) + u0 (m  )) 10] :
Letting g () =  (u0 (m  )  u0 (m+ )) and h ()  (u0 (m+ ) + u0 (m  )) ;
we are led to compare
EQ2 [f()g()10]
EQ2 [f()h(10]
with
EQ2 [g()10]
EQ2 [h()10]
; or equivalently
EQ2 [f()g()10]
EQ2 [g()10]
with
EQ2 [f()h()10]
EQ2 [h()10]
: Let us now dene the probability measure P g by dP
g
dQ2
=
g()10
EQ2 [g()10]
:We are led to compareEP
g
[f ()] withEP
g
h
f () h
g
()
i
EQ2 [g()10]
EQ2 [h()10]
:
The probability measure Q1 dominates Q2 in the sense of the market price of risk
of the second-order if and only if,
EP
g
[f ()]  EP g

f ()
h
g
()

EQ2 [g()10]
EQ2 [h()10]
:
It is easy to check that the function h
g
: x 7! (u0(m+x)+u0(m x))
x(u0(m x) u0(m+x)) is decreas-
ing on R+. Since f is increasing, then for any probability measure Q, we have
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covQ

h
g
() ; f ()

 0; and in particular, covP g

h
g
() ; f ()

 0: This implies
that
EP
g

f ()
h
g
()

 EP g [f ()]EP g

h
g
()

 EP g [f ()] E
Q2 [h()10]
EQ2 [g()10]
and EP
g
[f ()]  EP g
h
f () h
g
()
i
EQ2 [g()10]
EQ2 [h()10]
: This concludes the proof of the
Proposition.
The two previous propositions are consistent with an interpretation of an
MPR2 shift as some form of doubt. However, it is immediate (see e.g. Lands-
berger and Meilijson, 1993), that our dominance concept implies that for all x;
EQ1 [e j e  x]  EQ2 [e j e  x] ; which intuitively can be interpreted as some
form of pessimism.
As underlined by Landberger and Meilijson (1993), Equal-Mean Normal, Uni-
form and Shifted Exponential distributions are mean-preserving portfolio ordered
(henceMPR2 ordered) by their variances. Moreover, we have the following result.
Example 4.3. Let us assume that X1  N (1; 1) and X2  N (2; 2) : We
have Q1 <MPR2 Q2 if and only if 1  2 and 1  2:
Proof. 1. If 1 = 2 and 1  2 then the assumptions of Proposition 4.2 are
satised and consequently Q1 <MPR2 Q2: If 1  2 and 1 = 2; we have already
seen that Q1 <MPR1 Q2 and thenQ1 <MPR2 Q2: If 1  2 and 1  2; the result
is obtained by transitivity. 2. Conversely, suppose that Q1 <MPR2 Q2: It su¢ ces
to consider the exponential utility function to obtain that 1 a21  2 a22; for
all a 2 (0;+1) ; where a is the risk aversion parameter. The result easily follows.
Note that in the lognormal case, we also have that if Q1 <MPR2 Q2; then
1  2 and 1  2 (it su¢ ces to consider power utility functions).
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FIGURES
Figure 1
This gure represents the distribution functions of Q (dashed line) and P (solid
line).
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Figure 2
This gure represents the density of Pu (solid line) as well as the density of Q with
respect to P:
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Figure 3 & 4
These gures represent a situation where for some ; EQ1 [e1ex]  EQ2 [e1ex]
and Q1 fe  xg  Q2 fe  xg but without the rst-order stochastic dominance.
More precisely, we have e = (0; 1; 2), Q1 = (
1
3
; 1
3
; 1
3
) and Q2 = (
1
8
; 5
8
; 2
8
): In the
rst gure, the solid (resp. dashed) thin line represents the distribution function of Q2
(resp. Q1). The solid (resp. dashed) thick line represents the function EQ1 [e1ex]
(resp. EQ2 [e1ex]): We clearly do not have rst stochastic dominance. In the second
gure, the dashed lines are the same as in the previous one and the solid lines correspond
to Q1 [e  x] and EQ1 [e1ex] with  = 1618 .
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Figure 5
This gure represents a situation whereEQ1 [e1ex]  EQ2 [e1ex] andQ1 fe  xg 
Q2 fe  xg but where the comonotonicity condition is not satised. More precisely, we
have e = (0; 1; 2), Q1 = (
1
3
; 1
3
; 1
3
) and Q2 = (
1
8
; 4
8
; 3
8
): The solid (resp. dashed) thin line
represents the distribution function of Q2 (resp. Q1). The solid (resp. dashed) thick
line represents the function EQ1 [e1ex] (resp. EQ2 [e1ex]): The thin (resp. thick)
dashed line is clearly above (resp. below) the solid one. The dot-dash line represents
dQ1
dQ2
and is clearly nonmonotone.
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